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author. 1 Introduction
When analyzing a strategic situation, we often assume the common knowledge of payos and
describe the situation as a complete information game. However, an equilibrium outcome of
a complete information game may be very dierent from that of an incomplete information
game that departs slightly from the complete information game, as demonstrated by Rubinstein
(1989) and Carlsson and van Damme (1993). In this light, Kajii and Morris (1997a,b) introduced
the concept of equilibria that are robust to incomplete information. A Nash equilibrium of a
complete information game is said to be robust to incomplete information if every incomplete
information game the payos of which dier from those of the original game only very rarely
has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium close to the Nash equilibrium.
This paper introduces the concept of nested best-response potentials and provides a new
sucient condition for the robustness of an equilibrium to incomplete information. The nested
best-response potentials generalize the best-response potentials introduced by Morris and Ui
(2005), applying the idea of `nesting' based on Uno (2007) as follows. A best-response potential
of a game is a real-valued function on the set of action proles of the game that `incorporates
information' about every players' best-response. It is known that a maximizer of a best-response
potential is a Nash equilibrium of the game. It is as if the best-response potential is the payo
function of a representative agent that chooses strategies for all players.
In considering a nested best-response potential, we think of a representative agent for a
subset T of players, instead of one for all of them: for each player i in T, and for any given
belief over strategy proles of other players, maximizing this representative agent's payo fT
yields a best-response for each player i in T. Suppose that there is a partition T of players
such that, for each member T of T , there is such a representative agent whose payo function
is fT.3 Then the collection of fT's can be seen as a new complete information game, where each
member T in T is regarded as a single player. That is, the original game is reduced to a game
with a smaller number of players.
Notice that such reduction can be nested: the new game among step 1 representative agents
may be reduced to a game with an even smaller number of players, by considering a step 2
3This idea also has appeared as q-potential in Monderer (2007).
2representative agent for each member of a partition of step 1 representative agents, and then a
representative agent for each member of a partition of these, and so on. We say that a game has
a nested best-response potential if a game is reduced to a game with one representative agent
through this process. We call a unique maximizer of nested best-response potential a nested
BRP-maximizer.
The main result of this paper shows that a nested BRP-maximizer is robust to incomplete
information in sense of Kajii and Morris (1997b) (Theorem 4.1).
In the literature, various sucient conditions are given for robustness to incomplete infor-
mation in sense of Kajii and Morris (1997a,b). Kajii and Morris (1997a) provide sucient con-
ditions for games with unique correlated equilibria and for games with p-dominance equilibria
with low p. Ui (2001) provides a sucient condition for games with exact potential maximizers
(P-maximizers) introduced by Monderer and Shapley (1996). Morris and Ui (2005) provide a
sucient condition for games with generalized potential maximizers (GP-maximizers), which
strictly generalized the conditions of Kajii and Morris (1997a) and Ui (2001). Morris and Ui
(2005) also introduce three special concepts of GP-maximizer: best-response potential maximiz-
ers (BRP-maximizers), monotone potential maximizers (MP-maximizers), and local potential
maximizers (LP-maximizers).4 Tercieux (2006) provides a sucient condition for games with
p-best-response sets with low p, which strictly generalized two conditions of Kajii and Mor-
ris (1997a,b) but specialized the condition in terms of LP-maximizers, MP-maximizers, and
GP-maximizers. Oyama and Tercieux (2009) provide a sucient condition for games with iter-
ated MP-maximizers, which generalizes the condition in terms of MP-maximizers.5 Moreover,
Oyama and Tercieux (2009) also introduce two special but tractable concepts of iterated MP-
maximizers: iterated LP-maximizers and iterated p-dominance equilibria, since it is generally
a dicult task to nd an MP-maximizer and an iterated MP-maximizer.
We show that our condition in terms of nested BRP-maximizers strictly generalizes the condi-
tions in terms of P-maximizers and BRP-maximizers. We also demonstrate that our condition
neither implies nor is implied by the conditions in terms of unique correlated equilibria, p-
4Whether the condition in terms of BRP-maximizers implies the condition in terms of MP-maximizers is an
open question.
5It is not sure whether the condition in terms of iterated MP-maximizers strictly generalizes the condition in
terms of MP-maximizers.
3dominance equilibria, p-best-response sets, iterated LP-maximizers and iterated p-dominance
equilibria. However, it is left as an open question whether our condition implies the condi-
tions in terms of GP-maximizers, MP-maximizers, LP-maximizers, and iterated MP-maximizers.
We discuss advantages of our condition over the conditions in terms of GP-maximizers, MP-
maximizers, LP-maximizers, and iterated MP-maximizers in practical aspects(Remarks 5.11
and 5.18).
2 Robust equilibria
A nite complete information game consists of a nite player set N = f1;:::;ng, a nite action
set Ai for i 2 N, and the payo function gi : A ! R for i 2 N, where A :=
Q
i2N Ai. Since
we x the set A of action proles, we denote a complete information game (N;(Ai)i2N;(gi)i2N)
simply by gN := (gi)i2N. For notational convenience, we write a = (ai)i2N 2 A; for i 2 N,
A i =
Q
j6=i Aj and a i = (aj)j6=i 2 A i; and for T  N, AT =
Q
i2T Ai, aT = (ai)i2T 2 AT,
A T =
Q
i2NnT Ai, and a T = (ai)i2NnT 2 A T. We write (aT;a T) 2 AT  A T. We write
(ai;a i) instead of (afig;a fig) for simplicity. For i 2 N, a function f : A ! R and Xi  Ai,
let denote BR
f
i (ijXi) := argmaxai2Xi
P
a i2A i i(a i)f(a) and BR
f




Consider an incomplete information game with the player set N and the set A of action
proles. Let i be a countable set of types of player i. The set of type proles is  :=
Q
i2N i.
We write  i =
Q
j6=i j and  i = (j)j6=i 2  i; for T  N, T =
Q
i2T i, T = (ti)i2T 2 T,
 T =
Q
i2NnT i, and  T = (i)i2NnT 2  T. Let P 2 () be the common prior probability
distribution over the set  of type proles such that for each i 2 N and i 2 i, the marginal
probability of i is positive, i.e., Pi(i) :=
P
 i2 i P(i; i) > 0. A payo function for player
i is a bounded function ui : A   ! R. Since we will x N, , and A throughout the paper,
we simply denote an incomplete information game by (P;u), where u := (ui)i2N.
A strategy of player i is a function i : i ! (Ai). We write i for the set of strategies of
player i, and write  =
Q
i2N i and  = (i)i2N 2 ;  i =
Q
j6=i j and  i = (j)j6=i 2  i;
6For a set S, (S) denotes the set of all probability distributions over S.
4for T  N, T =
Q
i2T i and T = (i)i2T 2 T. We write i(aiji) for the probability of
action ai given i 2 i and i 2 i. For  2 , we write (aj) =
Q
i2N i(aiji) for a 2 A and
 2 ; for  i 2  i,  i(a ij i) =
Q
j6=i j(ajjj) for a i 2 A i and  i 2  i; for T  N and
T 2 T, T(aTjT) =
Q
i2T i(aiji) for aT 2 AT and T 2 T.
A strategy prole (i)i2N 2  is a (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium of (P;u) if, for each i 2 N,













i 2 Ai, where P( iji) = P(i; i)=
P
^  i2 i P(i; ^  i).
Given a complete information game gN and an incomplete information game (P;u), for each
i 2 N, consider the subset  i of i such that, if i 2  i is realized, i's payos are given by gi
independently of the every types  i of the other players:
 i = fi 2 ijui(a;(i; i)) = gi(a) for all a 2 A; i 2  i with P(i; i) > 0g:
We write   =
Q
i2N  i. An incomplete information game (P;u) is a -elaboration of gN if
P( ) = 1   , where  2 [0;1].
Kajii and Morris (1997a) introduced the robustness of equilibria to all elaborations.
Denition 2.1 An action distribution  2 (A) is robust to all elaborations in gN if, for any
" > 0, there exists   > 0 such that, for any 0 <    , every -elaboration of gN has an
equilibrium  with maxa2A j(a)  
P
2 P()(aj)j  ".
Kajii and Morris (1997b) also introduced the following weaker notion of robustness of equi-
libria to `canonical' elaborations.
A type i 2 in i is committed if player i of this type has a strictly dominant action
a
i
i 2 Ai, i.e., ui((a
i
i ;a i);(i; i)) > ui((ai;a i);(i; i)) for all ai 2 Ainfa
i
i g, a i 2 A i, and
 i 2  i with P(i; i) > 0. A -elaboration (P;u) of gN is canonical if, for each i 2 N, every
i 2 in i is a committed type.
5Denition 2.2 An action distribution  2 (A) is robust to canonical elaborations in gN if,
for every " > 0, there exists   > 0 such that, for all 0 <    , any canonical -elaboration of
gN has an equilibrium  with maxa2A j(a)  
P
2 P()(aj)j  ".
It is clear that if an action distribution is robust to all elaborations, then it is also robust to
canonical elaborations.7
3 Nested potentials
This section introduces the notion of nested best-response potential for complete information
games. The nested best-response potentials generalize the best-response potentials dened by
Morris and Ui (2005). A best-response potential of a complete information game gN is a real
valued function f on the set A of action proles such that, for each player i and any i's belief
i 2 (A i) over the set A i of other players' actions, i's best-response against the belief i in
the alternative game where i's payo function equals f, is also his best-response in the original
game gN:8
Denition 3.1 (Morris and Ui, 2005) A function f : A ! R is a best-response potential
of gN if, for each i 2 N, BR
f
i (i)  BR
gi
i (i) for all i 2 (A i). An action prole a is a
BRP-maximizer if fag = argmaxa2A f(a).
We generalize the best-response potentials by means of the `nested construction' proposed in
Uno (2007) as follows: rstly, for a partition T of N, we dene the T -best-response potentials:9
Denition 3.2 Let T be a partition of N. A best-response T -potential of gN is a tuple
(T ;(AT)T2T ;(fT)T2T ), where, for each T 2 T , fT : A ! R satises that, for each i 2 T,
7Whether or not the converse holds is an open question.
8There are three versions of best-response potential in the literature. The best-response potential of Morris
and Ui (2005) is a cardinal version of the pseudo-potentials introduced in Dubey et al. (2006). The one of
Morris and Ui (2004) is a version of best-response potential where the inclusion in the denition is replaced by
the equality. The one of Voorneveld (2000) is an ordinal version of best-response potential of Morris and Ui
(2004).
9The idea of games with partition T -potentials is same as that of q-potential games dened by Monderer
(2007) independently and earlier than Uno (2007): a game gN is a q-potential game if and only if gN has a
partition T -potential, where q refers to the number of elements in T . For convenience to dene nested potentials
we use the partition T -potentials.
6BR
fT
i (i)  BR
gi
i (i) for all i 2 (A i).
We denote such a T -best-response potential (T ;(AT)T2T ;(fT)T2T ) by fT := (fT)T2T since
action sets (AT)T2T can be derived from the partition T of N and the set A of action proles
in the original game gN. Note that any game has a best-response T -potential for the nest
partition T = ffigji 2 Ng. Note also that a game with a best-response potential is equivalent
to a game with a best-response T -potential for the coarsest partition T = fNg.
Notice that we can regard each T -best-response potential fT as a strategic form game, where
T is the player set; for each T 2 T , AT is the action set of T; and for each T 2 T , fT is the
payo function of T. The idea underlying the notion of the nested best-response potentials is
to construct such games iteratively:
Denition 3.3 A function f : A ! R is a nested best-response potential of gN if there exist a
nite sequence fT kgK






k=0 is a nested sequence of partitions of N: fT kgK
k=0 is an increasingly coarser se-
quence of partitions of N with T 0 = ffigji 2 Ng and T K = fNg;
 fT 0 = (f0
T)T2T 0 is the original game gN: for each i 2 N, f0
fig(a) = gi(a) for all a 2 A;
 for each k = 1;2;:::;K, fT k = (fk
T)T2T k is a T k-best-response potential of fT k 1 =
(f
k 1
T )T2T k 1, where fT k 1 is regarded as a strategic form game as above: for each T k 2 T k















for all Tk 1 2 (A Tk 1); and
 fT K = (fK
N ) is such that fK
N (a) = f(a) for all a 2 A.
An action prole a is a nested BRP-maximizer if fag = argmaxa2A f(a).
7It is clear that if a game has a BRP-maximizer, then it has a nested BRP-maximizer.
Nvertheless, even if a game has a nested BRP-maximizer, it may not have a BRP-maximizer as
shown later (Example 5.1).
4 Nested potentials and robust equilibria
This section provides a new sucient condition for the robustness of equilibria in terms of nested
BRP-maximizers.
Theorem 4.1 If gN has a nested BRP-maximizer a, then the action distribution  2 (A)
such that (a) = 1 is robust to canonical elaborations in gN.
We can show this theorem by arguments similar to those of Theorem 6 in Morris and Ui
(2005). Indeed, we replace Lemma 6 of Morris and Ui (2005) by Lemma 4.3 below. Let (P;u)
be a canonical -elaboration of gN and consider the set of i's strategies of (P;u) such that each
committed type i 2 in i chooses the strictly dominant action a
i
i :10
i := fi : i ! Aiji(i) = a
i
i for i 2 in ig:
Let  :=
Q
i2N i = f :  ! Aj() = (i(i))i2N for all  2 ; and i 2 i for all i 2 Ng: For
T  N, T :=
Q
i2N i.
Note that if (P;u) is canonical then  is nonempty (Morris and Ui, 2005, Lemma 4).
Let (P;u) be a canonical -elaboration of a complete information game gN with a nested





for all  2  and consider the set of its maximizers  := argmax2 V ().
10Indeed, we set a domain A of generalized potential of Morris and Ui (2005) to
Q
i2Nffaigjai 2 Aig.
8The function V is constructed in a similar way to that of generalized potentials in Morris
and Ui (2005). We can show the following lemma by an argument similar to Lemma 5 in Morris
and Ui (2005).
Lemma 4.2 If  is nonempty then  is nonempty. If  2  then
X
2;()=a
P()  1   ;
where  is a positive constant.11
We show that there exists an equilibrium of (P;u) assigning probability 1 to a maximizer
 2  of V , which corresponds to Lemma 6 in Morris and Ui (2005).
Lemma 4.3 Suppose gN has a nested best-response potential f and (P;u) is a canonical -
elaboration of gN. For  2 , (P;u) has an equilibrium  2  such that (j) assigns
probability 1 to the action () for all  2 , i.e., (()j) = 1 for all  2 .






 i( i));(i; i))]  0 (2)
for all ai 2 Ai. Fix any i 2 N and i 2 i. If i 2 in i, then (2) is true, since 
i (i) is the
strictly dominant action a
i
i of i.
Suppose that i 2  i. Let a positive integer K and sequences (fT k)K
k=0 and (T k)K
k=0 be such
that, for each k = 0;1;:::;K, fig = T 0  T 1    T K 1  T K = N, T k 2 T k and, f = fK
TK,
so that f is a nested best-response potential.
Firstly, since  2 argmax2
P
2 P()f(()) = argmax2
P











11Or,  > 0 is independent to . For example,  = [f(a)   mina2A f(a)]=[f(a)   maxa2Anfag f(a)].












for all aTK 1 2 ATK 1. Since fT K is a T K-best-response potential of fT K 1, by (1), for each










 TK 1( TK 1))]  0 (3)
for all aTK 1 2 ATK 1.










 TK 1( TK 1))]  0 (4)
for all TK 1 2 TK 1. Since T K 2  T K 1, we have T K 1 = T K 2 [ T K 1nT K 2, and so
(TK 2;















all  TK 2 2  TK 2. By arguments similar to those given above, we have, for each TK 2nfig 2











for all aTK 2 2 ATK 2.


















for all ai 2 Ai. Since i 2  i, we have (2).
Lemma 4.2 and 4.3 imply that (P;u) has an equilibrium  2  such that (()j) = 1














P()  1   :
Thus, for each " > 0, if we choose   = "= > 0, then, for each    , every canonical
-elaboration (P;u) of gN has an equilibrium  such that 1  
P
2 P()(aj)  ", which
completes the proof.
5 Related literature
The remaining of the paper shows the relationships between our condition (Theorem 4.1) and
the other sucient conditions in the literature.
5.1 BRP-maximizer versus nested BRP-maximizer
Morris and Ui (2005) shows that a BRP-maximizer is robust to canonical elaborations. Our
condition strictly generalizes the condition in terms of BRP-maximizers as shown in the following
example.
11T L C R
U 5;5;5 0;0;0 3;3;0
M 0;0;0 0;0;2 4;4;0
D 3;3;0 4;4;0 0;0;0
B1 L C R
U 4;4;4 0;0;0 2;2;2
M 2;2;2 3;3;0 0;0;2
D 0;0;0 0;0;2 3;3;0
B2 L C R
U 4;4;4 0;0;2 3;3;0
M 0;0;0 0;0;0 2;2;0
D 3;3;2 2;2;0 0;0;2
Table 1: A game (g1;g2;g3)
U;L U;C U;R M;L M;C M;R D;L D;C D;R
T 5;5 0;0 0;3 0;0 2;0 0;4 0;3 0;4 0;0
B1 4;4 0;0 2;2 2;2 0;3 2;0 0;0 2;0 0;3
B2 4;4 2;0 0;3 0;0 0;0 0;2 2;3 0;2 2;0
Table 2: A partition ff3g;f1;2gg-potential (f1
f3g;f1
f1;2g)
Example 5.1 Consider the three-person game gf1;2;3g = (g1;g2;g3) represented in Table 1,
where player 1 chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3 chooses the matrix.12
The game gf1;2;3g has no BRP-maximizer. Indeed, note that gf1;2;3g has a strict best-response
cycle (M;C;T) ! (M;R;T) ! (M;R;B1) ! (M;C;B1) ! (M;C;T). Since games with a
pseudo-potential cannot have strict best-response cycles as shown by Kukushkin (2004), then
games with a best-response potential, which is a special form of pseudo-potentials, cannot have
either. Thus gf1;2;3g has no BRP-maximizer.
Nevertheless, the game gf1;2;3g has a nested BRP-maximizer (U;L;T). Indeed, (f1
f3g;f1
f1;2g)
represented in Table 2 is a ff3g;f1;2gg-best-response potential of gf1;2;3g, where f1
f3g() =
g3() and f1
f1;2g() = g1() = g2(), and considering the ff3g;f1;2gg-best-response potential
(f1
f3g;f1
f1;2g) as a two-person game, we can show that ff1;2;3g = (f) represented in Table 3 is
a ff1;2;3gg-best-response potential of (f1
f3g;f1
f1;2g). Thus gf1;2;3g has a nested best-response
potential f and (U;L;T) is a nested BRP-maximizer.
Remark 5.2 In fact, Morris and Ui (2005) dene a more general form of best-response po-
tentials, a P-measurable best-response potential for a partition P of the set A, and provide a
sucient condition in terms of P-measurable BRP-maximizers. If P is the nest partition, i.e.,
P =
Q
i2Nffaigjai 2 Aig, then a P-measurable best-response potential is given by Denition
12gf1;2;3gjT restricted by T has a payo structure similar to the game in Ui (2001, p.1376).
12U;L U;C U;R M;L M;C M;R D;L D;C D;R
T 5 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
B1 4 0 2 2 0 2 0 2 0
B2 4 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
Table 3: A nested potential f
3.1. We can show that, for any partition P, (U;C;L) is not a P-measurable BRP-maximizer.
See Appendix A.1.
Remark 5.3 Ui (2001) shows that an exact potential maximizer (P-maximizers) dened by
Monderer and Shapley (1996) is robust to canonical elaborations. By Example 5.1, our condition
strictly generalizes the condition in terms of P-maximizers, since the best-response potentials
strictly generalize the exact potentials.13
5.2 Iterated MP-maximizer versus nested BRP-maximizer
Oyama and Tercieux (2009) introduce the iterated MP-maximizer and provide a sucient con-
dition for the robustness of equilibria in terms of iterated MP-maximizers.
For i 2 N, let Ai = f0;:::;mig.14 For i 2 N, we endow (A i) with the sup norm: jij =
maxa i2A i i(a i) for i 2 (A i). For " > 0, denote B"(i) = f0
i 2 (A i)j j0
i   ij < "g
and write B"((A i)) =
Q
i2(A i) B"(i).
Denition 5.4 (Morris and Ui, 2005; Oyama and Tercieux, 2009) Let X and X be in-
tervals such that X  X  A. X is an MP-maximizer set of gN relative to X if there exist
a function v : A ! R and a real number " > 0 such that X = argmaxa2A v(a), and for each



















13See Morris and Ui (2004).
14In fact, we can consider a more general case such that Ai is a linearly ordered set for i 2 N.
13Denition 5.5 (Oyama and Tercieux, 2009) An action prole a 2 A is an iterated MP-
maximizer of gN if there exists a sequence of intervals A = X0  X1    XK = fag such
that Xk is an MP-maximizer set of gN relative to Xk 1 for each k = 1;:::;K.
A game gN is said to be supermodular for i 2 N if, ai;a0
i 2 Ai with ai < a0
i and for
a i;a0
 i 2 A i with a i  a0





Theorem 5.6 (Oyama and Tercieux, 2009) Suppose that gN has an iterated MP-maximizer
a with associated intervals (Xk)K
k=0 and monotone potentials (vk)K
k=0. If, for each k = 0;:::;K,
gNjXk 1
i A i or vkjXk 1
i A i is supermodular for each i 2 N then a is robust to all elaborations
in gN.
We provide a necessary condition for MP-maximizer sets.15
Lemma 5.7 If an interval X  A is an MP-maximizer set of gN relative to an interval X  A
then, for each i 2 N, for each i 2 (X
 i), BR
gi
i (ijXi) \ X
i 6= ;:
Proof. Suppose that gN has an MP-maximizer set X relative to X with an associated mono-
tone potential v but there exist i 2 N and i 2 (X
 i) such that BR
gi
i (ijXi)\X
i = ;: Assume
maxBR
gi
i (ijXi) < minX
i . Then minBR
gi
i (ij[minAi;maxX
i ]) = minBR
gi
i (ijXi). Since v is
a monotone potential, we have minBRv
i(ij[minAi;minX






i ])  minBR
gi
i (ij[minAi;maxX





i (ijXi) < minX
i , we have minBRv
i(ij[minAi;minX
i ]) < minX
i . Since X is an
MP-maximizer, minBRv
i(ij[minAi;minX
i ]) = minX
i , a contradiction. By the similar argu-
ments, if maxBR
gi
i (ijXi) > maxX
i , we also have a contradiction.
For a xed order on A, even if our condition applies to a game, Theorem 5.6 may not apply
to the game, as shown in Example 5.8.
Example 5.8 Consider the game gf1;2;3g represented as in Table 1 again. Assume gf1;2;3g has
ordered action sets such that U < M < D, L < C < R, and T < B1 < B2. Theorem 5.6 does not
apply to gf1;2;3g. Indeed, note that gf1;2;3g is not supermodular for i 2 N. We will show that A is
15I am grateful to Olivier Tercieux for his suggestion. Discussion in Examples 5.8 and 5.17 was more compli-
cated before his suggestion.
14a unique iterated MP-maximizer such that an associated monotone potential is supermodular.
By Lemma 5.7, it is easy to show that only A, fUg  fLg  fTg, fUg  fLg  fT;B1g,
fUgfLgfT;B2g, or fUgfLgfT;B1;B2g may be MP-maximizer sets relative to A. Fix
any X3 2 ffTg;fT;B1g;fT;B2g;fT;B1;B2gg. Now, suppose that there exists a supermodular
monotone-potential v with MP-maximizer fUg  fLg  X3. Let 1 2 (A 1) be such that
1(L;T) = 1(C;T) = 1=2. Then we have fDg = BR
g1
1 (1). Since v is a monotone-potential,
we have maxBRv
1(1) = fDg. That is, we have
v(D;L;T) + v(D;C;T)  v(U;L;T) + v(U;C;T): (5)
Similarly, let 2 2 (A 2) be such that 2(U;T) = 2(M;T) = 1=2. Then we have fRg =
BR
g2
2 (2). Since v is a monotone-potential, we have maxBRv
2(2) = fRg. That is, we have
v(U;R;T) + v(M;R;T)  v(U;L;T) + v(M;L;T): (6)
Since v is supermodular, we have
v(U;C;T)   v(U;R;T)  v(D;C;T)   v(D;R;T); (7)
v(M;L;T)   v(D;L;T)  v(M;R;T)   v(D;R;T): (8)
By summing up inequalities (5)-(8), we have 2v(D;R;T)  2v(U;L;T), which contradicts to the
assumption fUgfLgX3 is an MP-maximizer. Thus, the game has a unique MP-maximizer
set A relative to A. Hence we does not apply Theorem 5.6 to the game under the ordered action
sets.
Remark 5.9 It is not sure whether or not our condition, as well as that in terms of BRP-
maximizers, implies the conditions in terms of iterated MP-maximizers and MP-maximizers.
In fact, consider the game gf1;2;3g represented as in Table 1 again. If gf1;2;3g has other ordered
action sets such that U < D < M, L < R < C and T < B1 < B2, we can nd an MP-maximizer
(U;L;T) such that an associate monotone potential is supermodular. Such a monotone potential
v is given by Table 4. Thus Theorem 5.6 applies to the game.
15T L R C
U 50 4  195
D  50 4 5
M  65 27 28
B1 L R C
U 40 23  175
D  30 24 25
M  45 47 48
B2 L R C
U 40 24  174
D  29 25 26
M  44 48 49
Table 4: A supermodular monotone potential v
Remark 5.10 Morris and Ui (2005) introduce GP-maximizers and provide a sucient con-
dition in terms of GP-maximizers. The condition generalizes the condition in terms of MP-
maximizers. So, it is also not sure whether our condition does not imply the condition in terms
of GP-maximizers, as well as that in terms of MP-maximizers.
Remark 5.11 Our condition has advantages over the conditions in terms of (iterated) MP-
maximizers and GP-maximizers in practical aspects. Generally, nding an (iterated) MP-
maximizer or a GP-maximizer is a hard task because no simple characterization for monotone
potentials or generalized potentials is known. If a game is not supermodular, it becomes a
harder task to apply the condition in terms of (iterated) MP-maximizers because we need to
nd an (iterated) MP-maximizer such that an associated (iterated) monotone potential is su-
permodular. Moreover, whether an (iterated) MP-maximizer exists or not depends on an order
over the set A of action proles, which is shown in Example 5.8 and Remark 5.9; and whether a
GP-maximizer exists or not also depends on a covering over the set A of action proles, which
is a domain of generalized potentials. However, how to choose an order for existence of an
(iterated) MP-maximizer and a partition for existence of a GP-maximizer are unknown.
On the contrary, nding a P-maximizer or a BRP-maximizer, if exist, may be an easier
task since the literature provides simple characterizations of exact potentials and best-response
potentials.16 In order to construct a nested best-response potential, we can use these charac-
terizations. And, we can apply the conditions in terms of P-maximizers, BRP-maximizers, and
nested BRP-maximizers regardless of an order and a partition of action sets.
16For example, Slade (1994), Monderer and Shapley (1996), Ui (2000), Uno (2007), Hino (2009), and Sandholm
(2010) for exact potentials; Morris and Ui (2004) for best-response potentials.
165.3 Iterated LP-maximizer versus nested BRP-maximizer
Oyama and Tercieux (2009) introduce the iterated LP-maximizer as a specic and tractable
form of iterated MP-maximizer.
Denition 5.12 (Morris and Ui, 2005; Oyama and Tercieux, 2009) An interval X of
A is an LP-maximizer set of gN if there exist a function v : A ! R such that X = argmaxa2A v(a)























i = fai +1g if ai +1 < minX
i and Z
+
i = X if ai +1 = minX























i = fai   1g if ai   1 < minX
i and Z
 
i = X if ai + 1 = minX
i . Such a function v is
called a local potential. If X is singleton fag then a is called an LP-maximizer. If the above
weak inequalities are replaced with strict ones, X is called a strict LP-maximizer set, and v is
called a strict local potential.
Denition 5.13 (Oyama and Tercieux, 2009) An action prole a 2 A is an iterated strict
LP-maximizer of gN if there exists a sequence of intervals A = X0  X1    XK = fag
such that Xk is a strict LP-maximizer set of gNjXk 1 for each k = 1;:::;K.
17A game gN is said to have diminishing marginal returns for i 2 N if, for ai 2 Ainf0;mig
and a i 2 A i, gi(a)   gi(ai   1;a i)  gi(ai + 1;a i)   gi(a).
Proposition 5.14 (Oyama and Tercieux, 2009) If a is an iterated strict LP-maximizer
of gN with associated intervals (Xk)K
k=0 and strict local potentials (vk)K
k=0, and if, for each
k = 0;:::;K, gNjXk 1
i A i or vkjXk 1
i A i has diminishing marginal returns for each i 2 N then
a is an iterated strict MP-maximizer of gN with monotone potentials (vk)K
k=0.
Corollary 5.15 Suppose that gN has an iterated strict LP-maximizer a with associated in-
tervals (Xk)K
k=0 and strict local potentials (vk)K
k=0. For each k = 0;:::;K, if gNjXk 1
i A i or
vkjXk 1
i A i is supermodular for each i 2 N, and if gNjXk 1
i A i or vkjXk 1
i A i has diminishing
marginal returns for each i 2 N then a is robust to all elaborations in gN.
Our condition does not imply the condition in terms of iterated LP-maximizers. To demon-
strate it, we use the following characterization of LP-maximizers provided by Morris and Ui
(2005).
Lemma 5.16 (Morris and Ui, 2005) An action prole a is an LP-maximizer of gN if, and
only if, there exist a function v : A ! R and a collection (wi(ai))ai2Ai of nonnegative numbers
for i 2 N such that X = argmaxa2A v(a) and, for each i 2 N and each a 2 A, ai < minX
i
implies
wi(ai)[v(a)   v(ai + 1;a i)]  gi(a)   gi(ai + 1;a i); and
ai > maxX implies
wi(ai)[v(a)   v(ai   1;a i)]  gi(a)   gi(ai   1;a i):
Example 5.17 Consider the game represented as in Table 1 again. Corollary 5.15 does not
apply to the game. For any order on A, note that gf1;2;3g is not supermodular for i 2 N and
does not have diminishing marginal returns for i 2 N. By Lemma 5.7 and Proposition 5.14,
only A, fUgfLgfTg, fUgfLgfT;B1g, fUgfLgfT;B2g, or fUgfLgfT;B1;B2g
18can be LP-maximizer sets. Clearly, A is an LP-maximizer set of gN such that an associated
local potential is supermodular for i 2 N and has diminishing marginal returns for i 2 N.
We show that A is such a unique LP-maximizer set of gN. To show by contradiction, suppose
rstly that fUg  fLg  fTg is an LP-maximizer set such that an associated local potential
v is supermodular for i 2 N and has diminishing marginal returns for i 2 N. For i 2 N, let
(wi(ai))ai2Ai be an associated collection of nonnegative numbers. Fix any order on A3. We
consider cases of orders on A1  A2 as in Table 5.
L < C < R L < R < C C < L < R C < R < L R < L < C R < C < L
U < M < D case 1 case 1 case 1 case 1 case 1 case 1
U < D < M case 2 case 3 case 4 case 4 case 10
M < U < D case 5 case 6 case 7 case 10
M < D < U case 2 case 3 case 10
D < U < M case 5 case 10
D < M < U case 10
Table 5: cases of orders on A
Case 1 Since fUgfLgfTg is an LP-maximizer set we have 0 > v(M;L;T) v(U;L;T). Since
v has diminishing marginal returns we have v(M;L;T)   v(U;L;T)  v(D;L;T)   v(M;L;T).
Since v is a local potential we have w1(D)[v(D;L;T) v(M;L;T)]  g1(D;L;T) g1(M;L;T) =
3. This implies w1(D) > 0 and v(D;L;T)   v(M;L;T)  3=w1(D). These inequalities implies
0 > 0, a contradiction.
Case 1' Since fUgfLgfTg is an LP-maximizer set we have 0 > v(U;C;T) v(U;L;T). Since
v has diminishing marginal returns we have v(U;C;T)   v(U;L;T)  v(U;R;T)   v(U;C;T).
Since v is a local potential we have w2(R)[v(U;R;T) v(U;C;T)]  g1(U;R;T) g1(U;C;T) = 3.
This implies w2(R) > 0 and v(D;L;T)   v(M;L;T)  3=w2(R) > 0. Thus, we have 0 > 0, a
contradiction.
Case 2 Since v is a local potential we have w1(D)[v(D;C;T)   v(U;C;T)]  g1(D;C;T)  
g1(U;C;T) = 4, w1(M)[v(M;R;T) v(D;R;T)]  g1(M;R;T) g1(D;R;T) = 4, w2(R)[v(M;R;T) 
v(M;L;T)]  g2(M;R;T) g2(M;L;T) = 4, and w2(C)[v(D;R;T) v(D;C;T)]  g2(D;R;T) 
g2(D;C;T) = 4. These inequalities imply that w1(D);w1(M);w2(R);w2(C) > 0 , and v(D;C;T) 
v(U;C;T)  4=w1(D), v(M;R;T) v(D;R;T)  4=w1(M), v(M;R;T) v(M;L;T)  4=w2(R),
19and v(D;R;T) v(D;C;T)  4=w2(C). Moreover, we have v(D;L;T) v(U;L;T)   2=w1(D),
v(M;L;T)   v(D;L;T)   3=w1(M), v(U;R;T)   v(U;L;T)   2=w2(R), and v(U;C;T)  
v(U;R;T)   3=w2(C), since v is a local potential and w1(D);w1(M);w2(R);w2(C) > 0. By
summing up these inequalities, we have 2[v(D;C;T)+v(M;R;T) v(D;R;T) v(M;C;T)] 
2=w1(D)+1=w1(M)+2=w2(R)+1=w1(C) > 0. Since v is supermodular we have 0  v(D;C;T)+
v(M;R;T)   v(D;R;T)   v(M;C;T). Thus we have 0 > 0, a contradiction.
Case 3 Since v is supermodular we have v(D;L;T)   v(U;L;T)  v(U;L;T)   v(U;C;T).
Since v is a local potential we have w1(D) > 0 and v(D;C;T)   v(U;C;T)  4=w1(D). Then
we have v(D;L;T)   v(U;L;T)  4=w1(D). Since v has diminishing marginal returns we have
v(D;R;T) v(U;R;T)  v(M;R;T) v(D;R;T). Since v is a local potential we have w1(M) > 0
and v(M;R;T)   v(D;R;T)  4=w1(M). Then we have v(D;R;T)   v(U;R;T)  4=w1(M).
Moreover, we have w2(R) > 0, v(M;L;T) v(D;L;T)   3=w1(M), v(M;R;T) v(M;L;T) 
4=w2(R), v(U;R;T)   v(U;L;T)   3=w2(R), v(M;R;T)   v(D;R;T)  4=w1(M) since v
is a local potential. Summing up these inequalities, v(D;L;T)   v(U;L;T)  4=w1(D) and
v(D;R;T) v(U;R;T)  4=w1(M), we have 2[v(M;R;T) v(U;L;T)]  4=w1(D)+5=w1(M)+
2=w2(R) > 0. Since fUgfLgfTg is an LP-maximizer set we have 0 > v(M;R;T) v(U;L;T).
Thus, we have 0 > 0, a contradiction.
Case 4 Since fUg  fLg  fTg is an LP-maximizer set we have 0 > v(U;R;T)   v(U;L;T).
Since v is supermodular we have v(U;R;T) v(U;L;T)  v(M;R;T) v(M;L;T). Since v is a
local potential we have w2(R) > 0 and v(M;R;T) v(M;L;T)  4=w2(R) > 0. Thus, we have
0 > 0, a contradiction.
Case 5 Since fUg  fLg  fTg is an LP-maximizer set we have 0 > v(D;L;T)   v(U;L;T).
Since v is supermodular we have v(D;L;T) v(U;L;T)  v(D;C;T) v(U;C;T). Since v is a
local potential we have w1(D) > 0 and v(D;C;T)   v(U;C;T)  4=w1(D) > 0. Thus, we have
0 > 0, a contradiction.
Case 6 Since fUgfLgfTg is an LP-maximizer set we have 0 > v(U;R;T) v(U;L;T). Since
v has diminishing marginal returns we have v(U;R;T)   v(U;L;T)  v(U;C;T)   v(U;R;T).
Since v is supermodular we have v(U;C;T) v(U;R;T)  v(D;C;T) v(D;R;T). Since v is a
local potential we have w1(D) > 0 and v(D;C;T)   v(U;C;T)  4=w1(D) > 0. Thus, we have
200 > 0, a contradiction.
Case 7 Since v is a local potential we have w1(M)  0 and w1(M)[v(M;R;T) v(U;R;T)]  1.
This implies w1(M) > 0. Since w1(M) > 0 and v is a local potential, we have v(M;C;T)  
v(U;C;T)  0, or equivalently, 0  v(U;C;T)   v(M;C;T). Since v has diminishing marginal
returns we have v(U;C;T)   v(M;C;T)  v(D;C;T)   v(U;C;T). Since v is a local potential
we have w1(D) > 0 and v(D;C;T)   v(U;C;T)  4=w1(D) > 0. Thus, we have 0 > 0, a
contradiction.
Other cases Since players 1 and 2 have symmetric payos, we can apply the above arguments
to the other cases. Hence, gf1;2;3g has no LP-maximizer set fUg  fLg  fTg such that an
associated local potential v is supermodular for i 2 N and has diminishing marginal returns for
i 2 N.
In the above arguments, we use only information on payos of players 1 and 2. So, we can
apply the same arguments to show that gf1;2;3g has no LP-maximizer set fUgfLgfT;B1g,
fUg  fLg  fT;B2g, or fUg  fLg  fT;B1;B2g such that an associated local potential v
is supermodular for i 2 N and has diminishing marginal returns for i 2 N. Therefore, A is
a unique LP-maximizer set of gN such that an associated local potential is supermodular for
i 2 N and has diminishing marginal returns for i 2 N. Hence, Corollary 5.15 does not apply to
the game.
Remark 5.18 In fact, Morris and Ui (2005) dene a more general form of local potentials, a
P-measurable local potential for a partition P over the set A of action proles, and provide a
sucient condition in terms of P-measurable LP-maximizers. It is not sure whether or not our
condition implies the condition in terms of P-measurable LP-maximizers. Consider the game
in Table 1 again. Assume an order on A such that U < D < M, L < R < C, and T < B1 < B2.
Let P = ffUg;fD;MggffLg;fRg;fCggffTg;fB1g;fB2gg. We can nd an LP-maximizer
(U;L;T) such that an associate P-measurable local potential is supermodular for i 2 N and
has diminishing marginal returns for i 2 N. Such a local potential v is given by Table 6. Thus,
the condition in terms of P-measurable LP-maximizers by Morris and Ui (2005) applies to the
game.
On the other hand, since a simple characterization for P-measurable LP-maximizers is un-
21T L R C
U 5 2  43
D  16  1 0
M  16  1 0
B1 L R C
U 4 1  40
D  13 2 3
M  13 2 3
B2 L R C
U 4 1  39
D  12 3 4
M  12 3 4
Table 6: A P-measurable local potential v with supermodular and diminishing marginal returns
known, nding a P-measurable LP-maximizers is a hard task, as we pointed out in Remark
5.11.
5.4 The other conditions
Our condition does not imply the other sucient conditions in the literature. Kajii and Morris
(1997a) show that a unique correlated equilibrium is robust to all elaborations. Kajii and
Morris (1997a) also show that a p-dominant equilibrium with low p is robust to all elaborations.
Tercieux (2006) shows that a unique correlated equilibrium whose support is p-best-response set
with low p introduced by Tercieux (2004) is robust to all elaborations. The condition in terms
of p-best-response sets unies two conditions of Kajii and Morris (1997a). Oyama and Tercieux
(2009) introduce the iterated strict p-best-response equilibrium and show that an iterated strict
p-best-response equilibrium with low p is robust to all elaborations.
Our condition does not imply the above conditions. Indeed, our condition applies to the
game in Table 1 as shown in Example 5.1. However, by Example 5.17, the conditions in terms
of unique correlated equilibria, p-dominant equilibria, p-best-response sets, and iterated strict
p-best-response equilibria, does not apply to the game since the above conditions are special
cases of condition in terms of iterated LP-maximizers (Corollary 5.15).17
Remark 5.19 The conditions in terms of unique correlated equilibria and p-dominant equilib-
ria, LP-maximizers, MP-maximizers, p-best-response sets, iterated strict p-best-response equi-
libria, iterated LP-maximizers, and iterated MP-maximizers does not imply our condition. In-
deed, in these conditions note that the conditions in terms of unique correlated equilibria and
17Note that gf1;2;3g has multiple correlated equilibria  2 (A) such that (U;L;T) = 1 and 0 2 (A)
such that 0(M;C;T) = 3=14, 0(M;R;T) = 0(D;C;T) = 3=28, 0(M;C;B1) = 2=7, and 0(M;R;B1) =
0(D;C;B1) = 1=7.
22in terms of p-dominant equilibria are the strongest. The condition in terms of unique cor-
related equilibria applies to matching pennies games but our condition does not apply to it,
since the game has a best-response cycle. We can also show that the conditions in terms of
p-dominant equilibria, as well as the conditions in terms of LP-maximizers, MP-maximizers,
p-best-response sets, iterated strict p-best-response equilibria, iterated LP-maximizers, and it-
erated MP-maximizers, apply to the game in Table 7 but our condition does not apply to
it. Indeed, the game has no nested BRP-maximizer since it has a strict best-response cycle
(M;C) ! (D;C) ! (D;R) ! (M;R) ! (M;C), and for two-person games, a best-response
potential is equivalent to a nested best-response potential. On the other hands, we can show
that (U;L) is p-dominant equilibrium for p1;p2 > 1=6.
L C R
U 5;5 0;0 0;0
M 0;0 0;1 1;0
D 0;0 1;0 0;1
Table 7: (g1;g2) has no nested BRP-maximizer
5.5 Iterative construction versus nested construction
At a general level the \nested construction" by Uno (2007) is related to the \iterative construc-
tion" by Oyama and Tercieux (2009). Both constructions are dened by applying a concept
in the literature iteratively. To compare between these constructions, we apply the iterative
construction to BRP-maximizer. To do this, we dene the BRP-maximizer sets.
Denition 5.20 For i 2 N, let X
i  Ai, and let X :=
Q
i2N X
i . X is a BRP-maximizer set
of gN if there exists a function f : A ! R such that X = argmaxa2A f(a) and, for each i 2 N
and all i 2 (A i), Xi  BR
f
i (i) implies Xi \ BR
gi
i (i) 6= ;.
Denition 5.21 An action prole a is said to be an iterated BRP-maximizer if there exists
a sequence of subsets of action prole A = X0  X1    XK = fag such that, for each







Table 8: A game (g1;g2;g3)
Remark 5.22 It is not sure that an (iterated) BRP-maximizer of Denitions 5.20 and 5.21 is
robust to canonical elaborations since we cannot apply the proofs by Morris and Ui (2005) and
Oyama and Tercieux (2009) directly.
The condition in terms of iterated BRP-maximizers neither implies nor is implied by the
condition in terms of nested BRP-maximizers.
Example 5.23 Consider the game gf1;2;3g represented as Table 8. The game has a unique BRP-
maximizer set A. Indeed, note that if X is a BRP-maximizer then it is an MP-maximizer. By
Lemma 5.7 only f(U;L;T)g, f(U;R;B)g, or A may be a BRP-maximizer. Suppose that f is
a best-response potential with a BRP-maximizer set f(U;L;T)g. Let 2 2 (A 2) be such
that 2(D;T) = 1, let 0
2 2 (A 2) be such that 0
1(D;B) = 1, let 3 2 (A 3) be such that
3(D;L) = 1, and let 0
3 2 (A 3) be such that 0
3(D;R) = 1. Then we have BR
g2




2) = fLg, BR
g3
3 (3) = fTg, and BR
g3
3 (3) = fBg. Since f is a best-response potential,
we have f(D;L;T) = f(D;R;T) = f(D;L;B) = f(D;R;B). And, since f(U;L;T)g is a BRP-
maximizer set, we have f(U;L;T) > f(U;R;T). Let 00
2 2 (A 2) be such that 00
2(U;T) = 1=6
and 00




2) = fLg. On the other hand, we have BR
g2
2 (00
2) = fRg. Since f is a best-
response potential we must have fRg \ BR
f
2(00
2) 6= ;, a contradiction. Thus, f(U;L;T)g is not
a BRP-maximizer set. By the similar arguments, we can show that f(U;R;B)g is also not a
BRP-maximizer set. Thus, the game has a unique BRP-maximizer set A. This implies that
there is no iterative BRP-maximizer in the game.
However, gf1;2;3g has a nested best response potential. Indeed, (f1
f3g;f1
f1;2g) represented in
Table 9 is a ff3g;f1;2gg-best response potential of gf1;2;3g, where f1
f3g() = g3() and f1
f1;2g() =
g1() = g2(), and then considering the ff3g;f1;2gg-best response potential (f1
f3g;f1
f1;2g) as a
two-person game, we can show that ff1;2;3g = (f) represented in Table 10 is a ff1;2;3gg-best
24U;L U;R D;L D;R
T 3;3 0;0 1;0 0;1
B 0;0 2;2 0;1 1;0




U;L U;R D;L D;R
T 3 0 1 0
B 0 2 0 1
Table 10: A nested potential f
response potential of (f1
f3g;f1
f1;2g). Thus gf1;2;3g has a nested best response potential f.
Example 5.24 Consider the game in Example 5.19 again. The game has an (iterated) BRP-
maximizer (U;L) of Denitions 5.20 and 5.21 such that an (iterated) best-response potential is
represented as in Table 11. But it has no (nested) BRP-maximizer of Denitions 3.1 and 3.3,
which is shown in Example 5.19.
L C R
U 5 0 0
M 0 1 1
D 0 1 1
Table 11: An (iterated) best-response potential
A Appendix
A.1 P-mesurable BRP-maximizer versus nested BRP-maximizer
Morris and Ui (2005) introduce a generalized version of best-response potential. Let Pi  2Ain;
be a partition of Ai. We write P = f
Q
i2N XijXi 2 Pi for i 2 Ng. A function v : A ! R is
P-measurable if, for X 2 P and for a;a0 2 X, v(a) = v(a0).
Denition A.1 (Morris and Ui, 2005) A P-measurable function v : A ! R is a best-
response potential of gN if, for each i 2 N, Xi \ BR
gi
i (i) 6= ; for all Xi 2 Pi and i 2 (A i)
such that Xi  BRv
i(i): A partition element X 2 P is a BRP-maximizer if v(a) > v(a) for
all a 2 X and a 2 XnX.
25Remark A.2 If P =
Q
i2Nfaijai 2 Aig, the P-measurable best-response potentials are given
by Denition 3.1 as mentioned in Morris and Ui (2005).
It is clear that a P-measurable function v : A ! R is a best-response potential of gN if and
only if, for each i 2 N, Xi 2 Pi, and i 2 (A i), Xi\BR
gi
i (i) = ; implies that Xi 6 BRv
i(i):
For i 2 N and a function f : A ! R, let denote BR
f
i (a i) := argmaxai2Ai f(a) for a i 2 A i
by abuse of notation. We provide a necessary condition for existence of P-measurable-best-
response potential.
Lemma A.3 Assume that for each i 2 N and each a i 2 A i, there exists ai 2 Ai such that
faig = BR
gi
i (a i). If gN has a P-measurable best-response potential then, for each i 2 N, for
each X i 2 P i, for each a i;a0
 i 2 X i, there exists a Xi 2 Pi such that Xi \ BR
gi
i (a i) 6= ;




Proof. Suppose that there is i 2 N, X i 2 P i and a i;a0
 i 2 X i such that, for each Xi 2 Pi,
Xi \ BR
gi
i (a i) = ; or Xi \ BR
gi
i (a0
 i) = ;. Assume that gN has a P-measurable best-response
potential v. Let i;0
i 2 (A i) be such that i(a i) = 1 and i(a0
 i) = 1. Since i's best
responses against a i and a0
 i is singleton respectively and for each Xi 2 Pi, Xi\BR
gi
i (a i) = ;
or Xi \ BR
gi
i (a0
 i) = ;, we have Xi;X0
i 2 P such that Xi 6= X0
i, Xi \ BR
gi





i) 6= ;. Since v is a P-measurable best-response potential and i's best responses
against a i and a0
 i is singleton, for each X00
i 2 PinXi, X00
i 6 BRv














 i) for every a00





contradicts to Xi 6= X0
i.
Example A.4 Consider the game in Example 5.1 again. We can show that for only the parti-
tion P = fAg in 125 possible partitions the game has a P-measurable best-response potential.
Indeed, rst, let consider P = ffUg;fMg;fDgg  ffLg;fCg;fRgg  ffTg;fBgg. The P-
measurable best-response potentials is given by Denition 3.1 as mentioned in Morris and Ui
(2005). By Example 5.1 there is no P-measurable best-response potential.
Next consider P = ffUg;fMg;fDgg  ffLg;fCg;fRgg  ffT;B1;B2gg. Let i = 1, X i =
fCgfT;B1;B2g, a i = (C;T), a0
 i = (C;B1). Since fDg = BR
gi




26there does not exist a Xi 2 Pi such that Xi \fDg 6= ; and Xi \fMg 6= ;. By Lemma A.3, gN
has no P-measurable best-response potential. By the similar arguments, for the other partitions
except the partition fAg, we can show that gN has no P-measurable best-response potential.
Thus, for only the partition P = fAg the game has a P-measurable best-response potential.
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